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本文运用高层梯队理论和心理契约理论,从管理者任期的角度,对晋升如何影响多元化决策进行了理论分析和实证检验。结果发现:晋升对多元化决策有一定抑制作用;随着既有任期的增加,管理者对晋升激励的敏感性以及晋升激励对多元化决策的抑制作用都会增强;但管理者对晋升激励的敏感性以及晋升激励对多元化决策的抑制作用并不受其预期任期的影响。进一步区分产权性质发现,上述现象在国有和非国有公司中存在显著差异。
In this paper, using the theory of echelon and psychological contract, we make a theoretical analysis and empirical test on how promotion affects diversified decision-making from the perspective of manager’s tenure. The result shows that promotion has a certain restraining effect on diversification decision-making. With the increase of existing tenure, managers ’sensitivity to promotion incentive and the restraining effect of promotion incentive on diversification decision-making will all be enhanced. However, managers’ sensitivity to promotion incentive The inhibitory effect of sexuality and promotion incentives on pluralistic decision-making is not affected by their expected tenure. Further distinguishing the nature of the property rights found that the above phenomenon is significantly different between state-owned and non-state-owned companies.