nvīksikī是印度早期哲学史中的一个重要符号,被看作印度语境中的“自然理性”。但由于《利论》对它描述的矛盾和印度知识传统本身的特殊性,它的内容和性质并不明确。H.雅各必等人认为它是哲学,P.哈恪等人则将它解读为纯粹的工具论。但这两种解读都带着一定的西方哲学的成见。它在实际历史中有一个变化过程,但都主要地依附于印度哲学各学派,从未发展成为独立的工具论:从内容看,它包含推理、辩论、修辞,甚至认识论等因素;从性质看,它并非可以进行演绎的逻辑科学,而是不能脱离实践因素和外在目的的技艺。 nvīksikī is an important symbol in the history of early Indian philosophy and is considered as “natural rationality” in Indian context. However, its contents and nature are not clear due to the contradiction between the theory of “interest” and the particularity of the Indian intellectual tradition itself. H. Jacob et al. Considered it philosophical and P. Hackett et al. Interpret it as a purely instrumentalist. However, both interpretations take some stereotypes of western philosophy. It has a process of change in the actual history. However, it mainly depends on the Indian schools of philosophy and has never developed into an independent tool. From the perspective of content, it contains such factors as reasoning, debate, rhetoric, and even epistemology. From the nature It is not a logical science that can be deduced, but a skill that can not be separated from practical factors and external ends.