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以2004-2009年的A股IPO公司为样本,我们探讨主承销商分析师买入推荐的可信性问题。我们的研究表明,在市场表现较差时,主承销商分析师倾向于给出买入推荐。此外,相对于主承销商,市场更相信其他券商分析师给出的买入推荐。我们还发现,其他券商分析师也能够识别主承销商买入推荐所包含的乐观性偏差。我们的这一结论为主承销商分析师所面临的利益冲突问题提供了直接证据,不仅有助于投资者更好地进行投资决策,也有利于监管当局对证券分析师行业对症下药,从而更好地保护投资者利益。
Taking the 2004-2009 A-share IPOs as a sample, we discuss the issue of trustworthiness of lead underwriter analysts. Our research shows that lead underwriters tend to give buy recommendations when the market is underperforming. In addition, relative to the lead underwriter, the market is more convinced by other brokerage analysts give buy recommendations. We also found that other brokerage analysts are also able to identify the optimistic bias contained in the lead underwriter’s buy recommendations. Our conclusion provides direct evidence of conflicts of interest faced by lead underwriter analysts, which not only helps investors make better investment decisions, but also helps regulatory authorities to make the right remedy to the securities analyst industry and thus better To protect the interests of investors.