本文以我国2014年A股上市公司为研究样本,分析了董事会独立性、股权制衡与真实盈余管理之间的相关性。研究结论表明,股权集中度与真实盈余管理正相关,股权制衡度与真实盈余管理呈正相关,但都不显著;股权越集中的上市公司不会为了短期利益而损害公司长期发展。独立董事占比与真实盈余管理程度呈正相关,两职合一与真实盈余管理程度呈正相关,但不显著;独立董事人数的增加并不意味着董事会独立性的提高,且独立董事并没有发挥其监控上市公司盈余管理行为的作用。因此,我国证券市场应不断加强对独立董事履行监管职能的监督,要做到真正发挥独立董事的作用,应从独立董事职责履行情况方面改进独立董事制度;同时,上市公司应该两职分离,从而抑制其盈余管理行为。 Based on the 2014 A-share listed companies in China, this paper analyzes the correlation between board independence, equity checks and balances and real earnings management. The conclusion of the research shows that ownership concentration is positively correlated with real earnings management, equity balance is positively correlated with real earnings management, but both are insignificant; the listed companies with more concentrated ownership will not harm the long-term development of the company for short-term benefits. The proportion of independent directors is positively correlated with the degree of actual earnings management. The combination of two positions is positively correlated with the degree of actual earnings management, but not significant. The increase in the number of independent directors does not mean that the independence of the board of directors is improved, and the independent directors have not played their Monitor the Earnings Management Behavior of Listed Companies. Therefore, the securities market of our country should continuously strengthen the supervision over the supervisory functions of the independent directors. In order to truly play the role of the independent directors, the independent director system should be improved from the fulfillment of the duties of independent directors. At the same time, the listed companies should be separated from each other to restrain Its earnings management behavior.