欧债危机自发生迄今已近四年,欧元区各方为有效解决债务危机做出了各种努力,然而效果并不明显,集中体现为债务危机的范围由原来的“欧猪五国”扩展到目前的“新重债七国”。危机深化的重要原因在于以ESM为主的援助方与以希腊等国为主的被援助方之间缺乏必要的信任与合作,从而导致了债务危机的蔓延。当前的相关研究鲜有涉及对欧债危机治理过程本身的分析,因而未能就援助方与被援助方之间的合作对策研究提供一个具有说服力的理论基础。基于此,本文利用演化博弈的方法,对欧债危机治理过程中双方之间的行为选择进行深入分析,从中得到的一个基本分析结论是双方合作的基础在于形成对双方行为的约束与激励机制。以此结论为理论基础,可引出关于欧债危机治理对策的政策含义。 Since the occurrence of the debt crisis in Europe for almost four years now, all parties in the euro zone have made various efforts to effectively solve the debt crisis. However, the effect is not obvious. The debt crisis has been concentrated in the scope of “debt pigs” “Expansion to the current ” new heavily indebted seven countries ". The important reason for the deepening of the crisis is the lack of the necessary trust and cooperation between ESM-based donors and those that are aided mainly by Greece and other countries, resulting in the spread of the debt crisis. The current related research rarely involves the analysis of the process of the European debt crisis governance itself, thus failing to provide a convincing theoretical basis for the study of cooperation measures between the aid and the aid recipients. Based on this, this article makes use of the evolutionary game theory to deeply analyze the behavioral choices between the two parties in the process of European debt crisis governance. A basic conclusion from this study is that the basis for the cooperation between the two parties lies in the formation of a restraint and incentive mechanism for the behavior of both parties. With this conclusion as the theoretical basis, it can lead to the policy implications of the European debt crisis management countermeasures.