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一、地方政府过度投资的内在机理我国自1994年实行分税制以来,地方政府拥有当地财政收入的部分剩余索取权,形成了中央政府一地方政府一企业的三级改革架构。地方政府作为经济人,拥有独立的利益目标,使地方政府有动力改善地方经济、扩大税源、提高地方GDP和居民福利水平。在三级改革框架中,地方政府作为独立经济利益方的介入使中国式渐进式改革得以相对平稳地推进,并且能以较低的摩擦成本加快我国的市场化进程(杨瑞龙等,2000)。在经济驱动和晋升压力的作用下,地方政府以埠外引资、地方发债、银行借贷多种手段筹集资金,
First, the inherent mechanism of over-investment by local governments Since China implemented the tax-sharing system in 1994, local governments have partial residual claim of local revenues, forming a three-tier reform framework for the central government, local government and enterprises. As an economic man, local governments have independent interests and goals. Local governments are motivated to improve their local economy, expand tax sources, and raise the local GDP and welfare level of residents. In the framework of the three-tier reform, the intervention of local governments as independent economic stakeholders has enabled the gradual reform of China to proceed relatively smoothly and speed up the marketization of our country with lower friction costs (Yang et al., 2000). Under the influence of economic drive and promotion pressure, local governments use various means to raise capital, such as extra-capitals, local bond issuance and bank lending,