一方面,为了适应市场利润率的变动,违约成本较低的雇主不希望与农民工签订正式合同;另一方面,由于地方政府可以得益于来自雇主的高政治租金和参与瓜分农民工的薪金损失总额,因此第三方实施的效力往往很低。在某种程度上说,这就帮助雇主实现了其不与农民工签订正式合同的意图。以上两个原因解释了雇主与农民工之间的低签约率现象。 On the one hand, in order to adapt to changes in market profitability, employers with lower default costs do not want to sign formal contracts with migrant workers; on the other hand, as local governments can benefit from high political rent from employers and participation in carousing of migrant workers' salaries The total loss, so the effectiveness of third-party implementation is often very low. To some extent, this helps employers realize their intention not to enter into a formal contract with migrant workers. The above two reasons explain the low signatory rate between employers and migrant workers.