论文部分内容阅读
本文的目的,是研究一个被“看不见的手的范式”所遗漏的制度性问题,即破产的问题。本文的第一部分将说明为什么关于“看不见的手的范式”的两种理解——“完全的市场”式的理解和“适者生存”的理解——没有也不可能正确地处理这个问题;第二部分是对美国破产法规的历史发展,即从不自愿到自愿,再到策略性破产,所作的一个简要回顾;第三部分将对这个发展
The purpose of this paper is to study a systematic problem that is missed by the “invisible hand paradigm,” ie bankruptcy. The first part of this article will explain why two understandings of the paradigm of “invisible hand” - “full market” understanding and “survival of the fittest” - can not and can not be properly addressed; The second part is a brief review of the historical development of U.S. bankruptcy laws, that is, from voluntary to voluntary and then to strategic bankruptcy. The third part is about this development