关于三十年代初期的英国远东政策,国内论著颇多,但侧重于军备的却较少。本文拟从新加坡基地——英国耗费巨资修建的“海上马奇诺防线”这个角度,就英国政府赋予它的含义,它在英国大战略中所占的地位以及它与英国远东政策的内在联系作一初浅的分析。一第一次世界大战后,英国“已经得到了一切——或者说更多一些……”。然而它也碰到了诸多问题:新获取的利益并没有增加英国的国力,反而增添了新的义务;自治领、殖民地的独立倾向不断增强;经战争摧残的国内经济急待恢复。此外,英国的海上霸权还受到昔日的盟国——美、日强有力的挑战。事实上,这一挑战在十九世纪末帝国的衰落初露端倪时就已出现“它(英国)有能力在西半球接受美国 There are a lot of domestic articles on British Far East policy in the early 1930s, but less emphasis is placed on armaments. This article intends to point out from the point of view that the British government has given it its place in the British grand strategy and its intrinsic link with the British Far East policy from the point of view of Singapore’s heavily capitalized “Marine Medina Line” Make an initial analysis. After World War I, Britain “has got everything - or more ...”. However, it also encountered many problems: the newly acquired interests did not increase British national strength, but added new obligations instead; self-government and colonialism tended to increase their independence; and the war-torn domestic economy was urgently restored. In addition, Britain’s maritime hegemony is also challenged by the allied nations of the past - the United States and Japan. In fact, this challenge has emerged at the dawn of the empire at the turn of the nineteenth century: "It (Britain) has the capacity to accept the United States in the Western Hemisphere