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国家重点生态功能区转移支付是主体功能区建设背景下协调区域利益的重要措施,合理的考核与激励机制则是保障资金使用效果、提高区县政府生态环境保护积极性的重要制度保障。从中央与区县政府之间的一般“委托-代理”模型分析出发,分析了引入相关可观测变量、构建相对绩效激励机制对改善考核激励效果、降低代理成本的作用。研究结果表明,中央政府在激励合同设计中应该考虑改变现有的单一指标考核体系,将有利于揭示区县政府努力程度及外部不确定性的可观测变量纳入考核指标体系中,以尽可能完善双方的信息状况;并结合区域所面临的系统风险情况,构建基于相对绩效的激励机制,从而实现考核激励合同的优化。
The transfer payment of national key ecological function zones is an important measure for coordinating regional interests under the background of the main functional zone construction. Reasonable examination and incentive mechanism are the important system guarantee to guarantee the use of funds and enhance the enthusiasm of the district and county governments for ecological environment protection. Based on the analysis of the general “principal-agent ” model between the central government and the county government, this paper analyzes the effects of introducing relevant observable variables and building relative performance incentive mechanism to improve the evaluation incentive effect and reduce the agency cost. The results show that the central government should consider changing the existing single index assessment system in the design of incentive contracts and include the observable variables that are conducive to revealing the efforts and external uncertainties of district and county governments in the assessment index system so as to improve as much as possible Both sides of the information situation; combined with the regional system risks faced by the situation, to build incentives based on relative performance incentives in order to achieve the optimization of the incentive contract.