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以我国2002~2007年A股制造业上市公司为研究样本,探讨官员晋升竞争对于企业税负的影响。研究发现,官员晋升竞争通过动力机制与压力机制对地区企业实际税负构成影响;动力机制方面,地方官员竞争动力越强烈,所在企业实际税负越高;压力机制方面,地方官员考核压力越重,所在企业实际税负越高;晋升竞争对于企业实际税负的影响因所有权性质而异;市场化水平对晋升竞争与企业实际税负具有显著的调节效应。
Taking the listed A-share manufacturing companies in our country from 2002 to 2007 as the research sample, the author explores the influence of officials’ promotion on corporate tax burden. The study found that officials promoted the competition through the power mechanism and the pressure mechanism on the actual tax burden on the regional enterprises; the dynamic mechanism, the stronger the competitive power of local officials, where the actual tax burden is higher; the pressure mechanism, the more stress the local officials examination , The higher the actual tax burden of the enterprise; the impact of promotion competition on the actual tax burden of the enterprise varies with the nature of ownership; the marketization level has a significant regulatory effect on promotion competition and the actual tax burden of the enterprise.