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陈刚的知觉二重论以内、外二重知觉的思想推进了心物—心身问题的研究,有许多优于以往相关理论的新内容。但它以自我意识心灵为脑中的感知主体,则引出了一些可商榷的问题,主要是心灵如何在脑中进行内在知觉的问题和心灵如何由脑来产生的问题。我们通过比较拉兹洛的双透视论具体讨论了这两个问题,最终引向了突现论与两面论的原则较量。
Chen Gang’s theory of double perception inside and outside the double perception promotes the study of mind-mind and body problems, and there are many new contents that are superior to the related theories in the past. However, taking self-conscious mind as the subject of perception in the brain leads to some debatable questions, which are mainly questions about how the mind performs internal perception in the brain and how the mind is generated from the brain. We discuss these two issues in detail by comparing Laszlo’s bi-perspective theory and eventually lead to the contest of principle between emergent theory and two-sided theory.