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研究了产出与需求均不确定下,由作为Stackelberg模型领导者的零售商,和作为追随者的供应商组成的两级供应链的决策问题,通过双方的博弈分析,得出批发价契约下零售商的最优订购策略和供应商的最优生产策略,分析比较集中化决策和分散化决策下供应链的利润及供应链成员的策略,分析发现分散化决策下供应商和零售商的两个决策变量之间呈线性关系。
This paper studies the decision-making of a two-level supply chain composed of the retailer who is the leader of Stackelberg model and the supplier who is the follower, under the uncertainty of output and demand. Through the game analysis of both parties, The optimal ordering strategy of retailers and the optimal production strategy of suppliers, analyzing the profits of supply chain and the strategies of supply chain members under centralized decision-making and decentralized decision-making, we find that the two strategies of supplier and retailer A linear relationship between decision variables.