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本文基于农村信贷市场的道德风险模型,运用合约理论,比较分析了借贷合约中引入监督机制后,不同贷款监督技术的效率及其对农户融资条件的影响。研究结果表明,只要贷款监督是有效的,则纯粹的中介监督、代理监督均可以降低最低担保品,有利于融资;而在直接监督贷款情形下,监督能否改善融资条件将取决于监督资本的超额回报同监督技术有效性之间的相对大小;同伴监督下的贷款更有利于抵押担保能力弱的借款人融资;而且在贷款监督基础上,引入提议更有利于农户融资。因此,农村融资制度的改进,应由政府外生主导型向民间内生型转变,进而积极引导纯粹的民营资本进入农村金融领域,充分发挥各类新型农民专业合作组织在农村融资活动中的作用。
Based on the model of moral hazard in the rural credit market and using the theory of contract, this paper analyzes the efficiency of different loan supervising techniques and their impact on the financing conditions of rural households after the introduction of supervision mechanism in loan contracts. The results show that, as long as the loan supervision is effective, the pure intermediary supervision and agency supervision can reduce the minimum collateral, which is conducive to financing. In the case of direct supervision of loans, whether supervision can improve the financing conditions will depend on the supervision of capital The relative size between excess returns and the effectiveness of supervisory techniques; loans under peer supervision are more conducive to financing for borrowers with weaker collateral; and based on loan supervision, the introduction of proposals is more conducive to the financing of rural households. Therefore, the improvement of rural financing system should be led by government’s external leading to non-governmental endogenous transformation, and then actively guide the pure private capital into the rural financial sector, give full play to the role of various types of new farmer specialized cooperative organizations in rural financing activities .