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在奈特不确定的环境下利用实物期权和最后通牒博弈建立了含糊规避决策者的并购时机与价格模型,着重分析了含糊度的变化对并购时机与价格的影响,并运用了M公司收购J公司的案例进行验证。结论表明:收购方提议和目标企业提议两种情景下,提议方的最优溢价比例不同,而响应方的最优并购时机相同。随着含糊度的增加,含糊规避决策者倾向于降低并购价格和提前实施并购,同时提议方与响应方的并购收益之差也呈缩小趋势。含糊度的增加削弱了提议方的先动优势。
In the uncertain environment of Knight, using the real options and the ultimatum game, the author establishes the timing and price model of vague avoidance decision maker, analyzes the influence of the change of ambiguity on the timing and price of M & A, and uses M company to acquire J The company’s case is validated. The conclusion shows that under the two scenarios of the bidder’s proposal and the target firm’s proposal, the Proposer’s optimal premium rate is different, while the Responder’s optimal timing is the same. As ambiguities increase, vague avoidance decision makers tend to lower M & A prices and implement mergers and acquisitions in advance, and the difference between the proposed and respondents’ M & A returns also decreases. The increase in ambiguity diminishes the first-mover advantage of the proposer.