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奎因的自然化认识论要求将认识论看作经验心理学的一章,对作为自然物的人类表层神经元之输入与输出关系的研究。物理的人类主体如何在其贫乏的输入而产生汹涌的输出,从而使自然理论超出现成证据的。奎因所要摈弃的正是以笛卡尔为代表的传统认识论,拒绝在经验认识论过程之外寻求先验预设的帮助,我们只能在这个过程自身不断丰富人类的认识。奎因如此认识论自然遭到一些哲学家的批判,尤其是其自然化认识论隐含着取消规范性的危险。认知规范不是在认识活动开始之先确立,而是在认识活动过程中完善,这是令传统认识论者匪夷所思的。这种相互争论背后的原因一直以来受认识方法论决定的,解决如此难题需要我们重新理解认识论方法论。
Quine’s naturalized epistemology requires that epistemology be regarded as a chapter of empirical psychology and the study of the relationship between input and output of human surface neurons as natural objects. How a physical human subject produces a raging output at its meager inputs leads to a surpassing of the natural theory beyond readily available evidence. What Quine wanted to abandon was the traditional epistemology represented by Descartes. He refused to seek the priori help outside the epistemological epistemology of experience, and we could only continue to enrich human knowledge in this process. Quine so epistemology was criticized by some philosophers, especially its naturalized epistemology implied the danger of eliminating normative. Cognitive norms are not established before the beginning of cognitive activities, but are perfected in the process of cognitive activities, which makes traditional epistemologists unimaginable. The reasons behind this mutual controversy have always been determined by the epistemological methodology, and solving such problems requires us to re-understand the epistemological methodology.