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博奕论是兴起于 2 0世纪中期 ,于近年来被引入我国的一种较新的经济研究工具。本文通过运用博奕理论 ,对我国信贷市场效率及商业银行“惜贷”行为进行了初步的探讨。根据博奕的分类 ,我国目前信贷市场可视为不完全信息不完美动态博奕 ,由于存在信息不对称现象 ,使我国信贷市场效率较低 ,并由此引发商业银行的“惜贷”行为。为增进信贷市场效率 ,令贷款企业提供担保措施虽然是一个可行的方法 ,但本文的分析表明这种方法并不能够根除低效率 ,而若要使信贷市场达到帕累托最优 ,只有改变信贷市场的信息不对称现状 ,本文为此设置两种方案 :提高商业银行辨别力和增大绩差企业伪装成本 (包括“粉饰成本”和“惩罚成本”) ,在一定的假设条件下 ,可以证明上述方案不失为理想的选择。
Game theory is a newer economic research tool that was brought into our country in recent years in the middle of the 20th century. Through the use of game theory, this paper discusses the efficiency of China’s credit market and the “looting” behavior of commercial banks. According to the classification of game, the current credit market in our country can be regarded as imperfect dynamic game. Because of the asymmetric information, the efficiency of credit market in our country is low, which leads to the “reluctant loan” behavior of commercial banks. In order to improve the efficiency of the credit market, it is feasible for loan enterprises to provide guarantee measures. However, the analysis in this paper shows that this method can not eradicate the inefficiency. However, if the credit market reaches Pareto optimality, Market information asymmetry status quo, this article set two options for this: to improve commercial bank discernment and increase dishonest corporate camouflage costs (including “whitewashing costs” and “penalties”), under certain assumptions, you can prove The above program is still the ideal choice.