本文以湖北A镇税费改革以来的乡镇政府改革为个案,发现乡镇政府改革在实质上表现为“非帕累托改变”。它具有这样三个特征:一是改革中一部分人利益的增加要以另一部分人的利益损失为代价,体现为绝对利益受损;二是即使全体社会成员的绝对利益都增加,它们的相对利益也会发生改变;三是由于利益实现方式的差异和成本投入的时滞,改革中的利益受损在一段时期内无法弥补。文章立足于发现各利益主体在乡镇权力结构中的相对位置,使改革方案本身就具有使某些人利益受损的特征,而改革方案的推行使得损益方案大部分实现,从而说明上述现象的成因。 This article takes the township government reform since the tax reform of town A in Hubei Province as a case and finds that the township government reform essentially manifests as “non-Pareto change ”. It has such three characteristics: First, the interest of some people in the reform should be increased at the expense of loss of interest of others; the second is that even if the absolute interests of all members of society increase, their relative interests Will change; Third, due to the differences in the way of realization of interests and the time lag of cost input, the damaged interests in the reform can not be compensated for a period of time. Based on the discovery of the relative position of various stakeholders in the power structure of towns and villages, the article has the characteristic that the reform program itself has the benefit of some people being damaged. The implementation of the reform program has made most of the profit and loss programs come true, so as to illustrate the causes of the above phenomena .