论文部分内容阅读
考虑到我国普遍存在大股东集中持股的客观现实,基于大股东“掏空”动机,区分大股东间“监督”与“合谋”两种不同关系,本文构建多个大股东存在下的董事会结构理论模型,并结合该模型的理论涵义推演出研究假设。以1999-2005年A股上市公司为样本对理论模型进行实证检验,结果表明,董事会中内部董事比例和第一大股东选派的外部董事比例都随第一大股东持股比例的增加而增加,随第二大股东持股比例的增加而减少;此外,当公司的终极控制为国有性质的时候,内部董事和第一大股东选派的外部董事比例更大,而独立董事比例则更少。实证检验的结果验证了理论模型的理论预期,表明所提出的理论模型能够揭示多个大股东存在下董事会的结构特征,同时印证了模型构建的正确性。
Considering the fact that our country’s stockholders generally hold a shareholding objectively, based on the motivation of the major shareholder “hollowing out ” and distinguishing the two different relations of “supervision” and “collusion” among the major shareholders, The theoretical model of the board structure in the presence of the shareholders, and deduce the research hypothesis based on the theoretical meaning of the model. The empirical test of the theoretical model from 1999 to 2005 A-share listed companies shows that the proportion of internal directors in the board of directors and the proportion of external directors selected by the largest shareholder all increase with the increase of the proportion of the largest shareholder, Decrease with the increase of the second largest shareholder’s share. In addition, when the ultimate control of the company is state-owned, the proportion of the external directors appointed by the internal directors and the largest shareholder is larger than the proportion of the independent directors. The result of the empirical test verifies the theoretical expectation of the theoretical model, which shows that the proposed theoretical model can reveal the structural characteristics of the board of directors in the presence of a large number of major shareholders and at the same time confirms the correctness of the model construction.