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一、问题的缘起 在理论上,股东大会被设想为股东控制经营者的一种工具,公司法的制度设计也为此而展开,但事实上,公司发展演变的结果,不是股东而是董事会控制了公司。其中的原因之一,是因为股东普遍对法律或公司章程赋予的得以控制公司经营者的权利不感兴趣。贝利(Berle)和米恩斯(Means)在20世纪30年代所完成的经典著作《现代公司与私人财产》中,实证分析了股东对股东大会上的权利表现出“理性的冷漠”(rationally apathet-ic)的缘由。其认为,大公司股份的持有非常分散,大多数股东认为花费时间、精力和财力试图改变无效率的经营方针是不值得的,因为作出这样的改变所付出的成本要高于投资本身所得到的回报,股东采取联合的行为是非常困难的。就上市公司而言,接受接管或者“用脚投票”对于股东脱离丧失信心的公司更有吸引力。
First, the origins of the problem In theory, the general meeting of shareholders was conceived as a tool for shareholders to control the operator, the institutional design of the company law to start, but in fact, the company evolved the result of development, not the shareholders but the board of directors control The company. One reason for this is because shareholders generally are not interested in controlling the rights of a company’s manager as given by the law or the articles of association. In the classic book Modern Company and Private Property, completed by Berle and Means in the 1930s, the empirical analysis of shareholders’ “indifference” to the rights at the general meeting of shareholders was “ (rationally apathet-ic) reason. In its view, the holding of shares in large companies is very fragmented, and it is not worth it to most of the shareholders who consider spending time, energy and money trying to change ineffective operating guidelines because the cost of making such a change is higher than the investment itself The return of shareholders to take joint action is very difficult. For public companies, taking over or ”voting with their feet" is more appealing to shareholders whose shareholders are free from loss of confidence.