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考虑供应链信任演化3个不同阶段,研究供应链信任稳定演化策略。针对传统博弈的局限性,从约束机制不健全和约束机制健全两个层面进行分析,将企业选择信任的额外收益、单方面信任成本、单方面不信任额外收益、单方面不信任代价和单方面信任额外补偿引入到演化博弈矩阵中,利用演化博弈理论分析各阶段的稳定状态。为验证模型的有效性和可行性,通过数值分析,研究模型的演化动力变化,得出相应的系统相图。研究结果表明,供应链信任策略值的概率大于0.75时,合作达到稳态,供应链整体收益最大;约束机制不健全下的稳定演化策略明显优于传统博弈下的稳定演化策略,但是约束机制不健全,企业的稳定演化策略未必都是信任;供应链企业间需要健全约束机制,当约束机制健全时,信任是企业最终策略选择。
Considering three different stages of supply chain trust evolution, we study the strategy of steady evolution of supply chain trust. Aiming at the limitations of the traditional game, the paper analyzes the two aspects of the restraint mechanism and the soundness of the restraint mechanism, and analyzes the additional benefits of the enterprise’s choice of trust, the unilateral trust cost, unilateral untrusted extra income, unilateral untrust cost and unilateral The additional compensation of trust is introduced into the evolutionary game matrix, and the evolutionary game theory is used to analyze the steady state of each phase. In order to verify the validity and feasibility of the model, numerical analysis is conducted to study the evolutionary dynamics of the model and the corresponding system phase diagrams are obtained. The results show that when the probability of the trust value of the supply chain is greater than 0.75, the cooperation reaches the steady state, and the overall return of the supply chain is maximized. The steady evolution strategy under the restraint mechanism is obviously better than the steady evolution strategy under the traditional game, but the restraint mechanism is not It is not necessarily trustworthy to stabilize and evolve strategies of enterprises. Supply chain enterprises need sound constraint mechanism. When restraint mechanism is sound, trust is the final strategy choice of enterprises.