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通过对企业集团的成员企业进行实证检验,我们发现:企业集团内部资本配置损害其成员企业的价值。控制权与现金流权分离程度大和规模大的成员企业,企业集团内部资本配置活动对其价值的损害比较显著。民营集团内部资本配置有利于其成员企业价值的提升,尤其是规模小的成员企业受益于集团内部的资本配置活动。中央政府为最终控制人的集团,其内部资本配置活动有利于成员企业价值的提升,集团内部资本配置尤其使规模小和存在融资约束的成员企业受益;地方政府为最终控制人的集团,内部资本配置活动往往不利于其成员企业价值的提升。
Through the empirical test of the member enterprises of the enterprise group, we find that the internal capital allocation of the enterprise group undermines the value of its member enterprises. The separation of control and cash flow rights is large and large member enterprises, enterprise groups, the internal capital allocation activities damage their value more significant. Private capital allocation within the group is conducive to the promotion of the value of its member companies, especially small member enterprises to benefit from the Group’s internal capital allocation activities. The central government as the ultimate controller of the group, its internal capital allocation activities are conducive to the promotion of the value of member companies, intra-group capital allocation in particular to small-scale and financial constraints of the member enterprises to benefit; local government as the ultimate controller of the group, internal capital Configuration activities are often detrimental to the value of their member companies.