论文部分内容阅读
本文以新准则实施后2007年和2008年中国A股上市公司为样本,研究发现新准则下进行机会主义债务重组的公司主要是已经连续两年亏损面临停牌风险的公司,而一年亏损的公司则对这一极端盈余管理手段的使用比较谨慎,并不倾向于进行债务重组来避免被特别处理。同时,发挥外部公司治理功能的审计师能够在一定程度察觉这些公司的机会主义行为,但是由于我国退市制度中没有对审计意见的严格规定,使得审计意见对公司进行机会主义债务重组行为的制约作用较弱。
After the implementation of the new guidelines in 2007 and 2008, the A-share listed companies in China were sampled. The study found that companies under the new guidelines for reorganization of opportunistic debt are mainly companies that have suffered losses for two years in a row, and companies that have suffered losses for one year The use of this extreme surplus management approach is more cautious and does not tend to be restructured to avoid special treatment. At the same time, auditors who play external corporate governance functions can perceive the opportunist behavior of these companies to a certain extent. However, because there is no strict stipulation on audit opinions in China’s delisting system, audit opinions constrain the company’s opportunistic debt restructuring. The effect is weaker.