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本文讨论的主题是胡塞尔现象学中的质料概念。本文将首先展示胡塞尔在第一次表述其先验现象学的代表著作《观念I》中支持的一种无形式的质料概念。然而,这一概念的使用给他先验现象学的整体框架带来了诸多困难,由此也引来了许多批评。其次,作为对上述困难的回应,胡塞尔在《被动综合分析》这部讲课稿中,创造性地发展了一种新的质料概念。这一新的质料概念根植于胡塞尔对于原初联想这一基于时间意识的构成性活动的发现和分析。这一新的质料概念,不仅使得胡塞尔可以回应基于《观念I》而来的批评,而且揭示了感知活动中包含的意识被动综合的层次,及其本质结构和认识论贡献。
The subject of this article is the concept of material in Husserl’s phenomenology. This paper will first show Husserl’s concept of an informal material supported in Concept One, the first representative of his transcendental phenomenology. However, the use of this concept posed many difficulties to his holistic framework of transcendental phenomenology, which led to many criticisms. Second, in response to the above difficulties, Husserl has creatively developed a new concept of matter in his “Passive Synthesis Analysis” lecture. This new concept of material is rooted in Husserl’s discovery and analysis of the primordial association, a time-conscious constituent activity. This new concept of material not only enables Husserl to respond to the criticism based on “Concept I”, but also reveals the passive synthesis of consciousness contained in the level of awareness and its essential structure and epistemological contribution.