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通过构建一个简单的政府间博弈模型,并以分税制改革后中国1994—2011年各省面板数据为基础,分析了中央转移支付对地区产业结构合理化的影响。研究表明,地方政府出于自身利益的考虑而采取的投资行为会使转移支付对地区产业结构合理化产生两方面效应,即一方面转移支付倾向于给当地带来GDP高增长的资本密集型投资类项目而直接扩大了地区产业结构的偏离度;另一方面国有企业与转移支付的相互作用同时也会阻碍地区产业结构的合理化调整。对我国东中西部不同区域的比较,发现西部地区转移支付对地区产业结构合理化的负面影响更大。
By constructing a simple model of intergovernmental game and analyzing the panel data of provinces in China from 1994 to 2011 after tax-sharing reform, this paper analyzes the impact of central transfer payment on the rationalization of regional industrial structure. The research shows that the investment behavior taken by local governments for their own interests will make the transfer payment have two effects on the rationalization of regional industrial structure: on the one hand, the transfer-payment tends to give the local high-growth GDP-intensive capital-intensive investment Project directly expand the regional industrial structure deviation; the other hand, the interaction between state-owned enterprises and transfer payments will also hinder the rational adjustment of industrial structure in the region. Comparison of different regions in the eastern, middle and western parts of China shows that the transfer payment in the western region has a greater negative impact on the rationalization of the industrial structure in the region.