“把地方政府行为激励做对”是中国政治经济的重要问题。本文将中国的中央政府与地方政府关系放入一个委托-代理模型进行考察,其中中央政府以追求经济产出最大化为主要目标,地方政府则以追求由奖惩系数加权的财政收入最大化为目标。现有的分权制度和分税制改革为地方政府大力发展经济提供了重要的行为激励,使地方政府有动力不断追求资本引进和积累,创造了中国经济增长的奇迹。随着中国经济结构变迁进程的推移,如何重塑地方政府行为激励机制,是中央政府面临的重要挑战。要解决这些问题,中央政府要将培育人力资本和鼓励企业研发创新作为政策目标,引导地方政府通过创设良好社会环境、提高法治建设水平来吸引和培养高素质人才,从而达到降低社会矛盾、提升国家发展水平、实现国家长治久安的最终目标。 “Encouraging Local Government Actions” is an important issue in China’s political economy. This paper examines the relationship between the central government and the local government in China through a principal-agent model, in which the central government pursues the maximization of economic output as its main goal while the local government aims at maximizing the fiscal revenue weighted by the rewards and penalties . The existing decentralization and tax-sharing reforms have provided important behavioral incentives for local governments to develop their economy so that local governments are motivated to pursue capital import and accumulation and create a miracle in China’s economic growth. As the process of China’s economic structural changes progresses, how to reshape the incentive mechanism of local government behavior is an important challenge that the Central Government faces. To solve these problems, the central government should take the cultivation of human capital and encourage the R & D of enterprises as its policy goal and guide the local governments to attract and train high-quality talents by creating a favorable social environment and raising the level of the rule of law so as to reduce social conflicts and enhance the national Level of development and achieve the ultimate goal of long-term peace and stability of the country.