本文构建异质性随机边界技术创新模型,定量估算了我国上市公司的技术创新效率,分析了代理冲突对技术创新效率的影响。结果表明:(1)代理冲突问题使得中国上市公司的技术创新效率比最优水平低了25%-45%。(2)股权集中度和制衡度的提高以及高管激励政策的实施会显著降低代理冲突水平,提升企业的创新投入;机构持股不是影响代理冲突的关键因素。(3)样本期间内,国有控股上市公司技术创新效率呈现稳步增加趋势,渐渐高于非国有上市公司。 This paper constructs a heterogeneous random border technology innovation model, quantitatively estimated the efficiency of technological innovation of listed companies in China, and analyzed the impact of agency conflicts on the efficiency of technological innovation. The results show that: (1) The problem of agency conflicts makes the efficiency of technological innovation of Chinese listed companies lower than the optimal level by 25% -45%. (2) The improvement of the concentration and balance of ownership and the implementation of executive incentive policies will significantly reduce the level of agency conflicts and enhance the innovation investment of enterprises. Institutional ownership is not the key factor that affects agency conflicts. (3) During the sample period, the efficiency of state-controlled listed companies in technological innovation showed a steady increase trend, gradually higher than non-state-owned listed companies.