论文部分内容阅读
从我国建设市场的实际出发,提出建设项目当事人风险态度多样性的命题。在不同假设条件下求解委托代理模型,并提出相应的激励策略。比较静态分析表明,引进风险偏好的假设,会使目标函数的凹凸性随着参数条件的改变而改变,从而显著提高激励策略的复杂性。在“委托人风险偏好,代理人风险规避”假设条件下,要求的激励强度较低,有些时候为了帮助代理人克服畏惧感,除了不让其承担项目的任何风险,还要通过其他手段对其加以鼓励。而在“委托人风险中性,代理人风险偏好”的假设条件下,要求的激励强度较高,有些时候为了抑制代理人的冒险冲动,除了让其承担项目的全部风险,还要通过其他手段对其施加压力。
From the reality of our country’s construction market, propositions about the diversity of risk attitude of parties involved in construction projects are proposed. Solve the principal-agent model under different assumptions and propose corresponding incentive strategies. The comparative static analysis shows that the introduction of the assumption of risk preference will change the concavity and convexity of the objective function with the change of the parameter conditions, thus significantly increasing the complexity of the incentive strategy. In the “client risk appetite, agent risk aversion” under the conditions of the required incentive intensity is low, sometimes to help agents to overcome the fear, in addition to not let it bear any risk of the project, but also by other means Encourage them. However, under the assumption of “client risk neutrality, agent risk appetite”, the required incentive intensity is high, and in some cases, in order to restrain the agent’s risk impulse, in addition to letting the project bear the full risk of the project, Other means put pressure on them.