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1985年10月27日,安阳矿务局岗子窑煤矿在掘进22021工作面风巷时,发生重大的透水责任事故,造成6人死亡,3人轻伤,直接经济损失近3万元。负有主要责任的矿领导和技术负责人受到了严肃的政纪和刑事处分。惨痛的教训对今后搞好矿井防治水工作,防止类似事故发生,具有一定的现实意义。 一、概况及事故经过 岗子窑煤矿年生产能力30万吨(1984年生产煤38万吨)。1985年10月,为保证工作面生产接替,矿领导决定加快22021回风巷掘进工作,在施工中改变原设计而沿顶板修复旧上山为22021回风巷。该巷为梯形断面木棚支护,棚距0.5米,净断面4.9米~2。事故前在掘第3段上山时,改变原设计沿旧石门上山老巷向上掘进施工。掘进中与上部水仓旧联络巷打通发生恶性的透水事故。旧联络巷积水约300米~3。 二、事故原因 1.事故前该矿领导忽视安全工作,所有新招的农民工(在该队占93％)几乎没有预防井下各种灾害的常识,甚至连老工人(放炮员)也不执行《煤矿安全规程》和《作业规程》规定,发现炮眼发潮渗水并有臭味等隐患时,仍擅自放了炮,造成与上部水仓旧联络巷贯通而发生严重的恶性透水事故。这是事故的直接原因。 2.生产技术管理混乱是事故的根本原因:①技术人员对掘进作业规程极不重视,不做详细讲解而交队里随便读一遍了事;②图纸资
On October 27, 1985, Gangziyao Coal Mine of Anyang Mining Bureau encountered a major water permeable responsibility accident when driving 22021 face air gap, causing 6 deaths and 3 minor injuries. The direct economic loss was nearly 30,000 yuan. The mine leaders and chief technology officers who bear the primary responsibility have been severely dealt with by political discipline and criminal penalties. Painful lessons for future mine water prevention work to prevent similar accidents, has some practical significance. I. General Situation and Accidents The annual production capacity of Gangziyao Coal Mine has reached 300,000 tons (produced 380,000 tons of coal in 1984). October 1985, in order to ensure the succession of face production, mine leaders decided to speed up 22021 return airway heading work, change the original design in the construction along the roof to repair the old mountain 22021 return airway. The lane for the trapezoidal cross-section timber shed support, shed 0.5 meters, a net section of 4.9 meters ~ 2. Before the accident, when digging up the 3rd section of the hill, change the original design along the old Shek Mun upstairs lanes up tunneling construction. Tunneling and the upper water tank old contact Lane opened vicious flooding accident. Old contact lane water about 300 meters ~ 3. Second, the cause of the accident 1. The mine leaders ignore the safety of the accident before the accident, all newly recruited migrant workers (in the team accounted for 93%) almost no common sense to prevent various disasters underground, and even the old workers (gunmen) are not implemented “Coal Mine Safety Regulations” and “operating procedures” provides that the discovery of the blast hole blasting and odor and other hidden dangers, still unauthorized release of artillery, resulting in the old contact with the upper part of the reservoir through the lane and a serious vicious flooding accident. This is the direct cause of the accident. 2. Production technology and management chaos is the root cause of the accident: ① technicians on the tunneling operating procedures very seriously, do not explain in detail and go to the club casually read it again; ② drawings