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机构投资者的快速崛起正改变我国公司的治理结构。本文选取2004-2007年有机构投资者持股的公司为样本,考察机构投资者在公司治理中的角色。全部样本的结果显示,机构投资者持股与公司业绩正相关,机构投资者在公司治理中扮演着有效监督者角色。分组样本研究结果表明:持股较高时机构投资者能改善公司业绩,符合有效监督假说;持股较低时机构投资者对公司业绩产生负面影响,符合利益冲突假说和战略结盟假说。研究结果意味着,机构投资者在公司治理中的角色取决于其持股情况:持股高时机构投资者扮演有效监督者角色,持股低时充当利益攫取者角色。
The rapid rise of institutional investors is changing the corporate governance structure in our country. This article selects the companies with institutional investors’ shareholdings in 2004-2007 as a sample to examine the role of institutional investors in corporate governance. The results of the entire sample show that institutional investor ownership is positively correlated with company performance and that institutional investors play an effective role as supervisor in corporate governance. The results of the grouping sample show that: institutional investors can improve the performance of the company when the shareholding is higher, which is in line with the effective supervision hypothesis; institutional investors have a negative impact on the company’s performance when the shareholding is low, which accords with the conflict of interest hypothesis and the strategic alliance hypothesis. The findings suggest that the role of institutional investors in corporate governance depends on their holdings: Institutional investors act as effective watchdogs in high holdings and act as profit grabbers in low holdings.