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根据环境规制对中国能源产业清洁生产激励机制的两阶段博弈分析,环境规制对中国能源产业清洁生产的激励相容存在强、弱充分条件之分;政府当期正式环境规制的财政和金融政策、同期非正式环境规制与能源企业自身同期环保要素高效投入的有机结合是其强充分条件;政府当期正式环境规制排污收费标准(环境保护税税率)的有效机制设计是其弱充分条件。两者均内生地包括环境规制对中国能源产业清洁生产的正向激励机制和负向激励机制;能源企业当期仅达标排污行为会自发地引致相应的正向激励机制,而能源企业同期超标排污行为则会自发地引致相应的负向激励机制。当两个充分条件中有一个充分条件满足时,环境规制对中国能源产业清洁生产的激励机制兼备惩罚约束与激励相容,代表性能源企业当期实施完全遵守正式环境规制策略是其稳定的占优策略,故其会全力践行其能源产品的清洁生产,从而实现其个人理性与集体理性的有机统一。而在强、弱充分条件均失效时,政府客观准确地量化环境自身质量的当期估值和因良好环境质量而引致的当期正外部收益,且有效削减其同期正式环境规制的监管成本,将予以其同期执行严格正式环境规制策略的正向激励,进而倒逼代表性能源企业同期实施完全遵守正式环境规制策略。
According to the two-stage game analysis of the environmental regulation on the incentive mechanism of cleaner production in China’s energy industry, there are strong and weak sufficient conditions for the environmental regulation to stimulate the clean production in China’s energy industry. The fiscal and financial policies of the formal government environmental regulation during the same period It is a strong enough condition that the informal environmental regulation and the efficient integration of environmental protection elements during the same period of the energy enterprise itself are strong and sufficient conditions. The effective mechanism design of the formal environmental regulation sewage charge standard (environmental protection tax rate) of the government is its weakly sufficient condition. Both of them endogenously include the positive and negative incentives that environmental regulation exerts on clean production in China’s energy industry. Only when the energy companies meet the standards for emissions only spontaneously lead to a corresponding positive incentive mechanism, while the energy companies’ excessive emissions during the same period It will spontaneously lead to the corresponding negative incentive mechanism. When one of the two sufficient conditions is satisfied, the incentive mechanism of environmental regulation on clean production of China’s energy industry is compatible with incentive and restraint. The representative energy enterprises’ implementation of full compliance with the formal environmental regulation strategy during the current period is its stable dominance Strategy, so it will fully practice the clean production of its energy products, so as to realize the organic unity of its individual rationality and collective rationality. When both strong and weak conditions fail, the government objectively and accurately quantifies the current valuation of the environment itself and the current positive external benefits due to good environmental quality, and effectively reduces the regulatory costs of formal environmental regulation over the same period. It will give In the same period, it implemented a positive stimulus to strictly formal environmental regulation strategy, forcing the representative energy enterprises to implement the full compliance with the formal environmental regulation strategy in the same period.