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从信息经济学的角度分析了供应商逆向选择行为出现的根本原因与必要条件,在此基础上探讨了如何利用供应商声誉和供应商利用信号显示原理来传递自身信息,以及采购企业通过实施选择与认证机制,或是通过显示原理设计报酬合同并根据供应商的选择结果来判断供应商的真实信息或类型,从而有效地降低了交易双方之间的信息不对称程度,并解决了供应商逆向选择问题。
From the perspective of information economics, this paper analyzes the root causes and necessary conditions for the adverse selection behavior of suppliers, and on this basis, discusses how to use the supplier reputation and suppliers to use the signal display principle to convey their own information, as well as procurement enterprises through the implementation of the choice And certification mechanism, or through the display design principles of remuneration contracts and supplier selection results to determine the true information or type of suppliers, thus effectively reducing the transaction information asymmetry between the two sides and solve the supplier reverse Choose the problem