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本文上下两篇分别对休谟法则即“不可能从‘是’推出‘应该’”的哲学根据和逻辑根据提出质疑。上篇主要检讨休谟法则的哲学根据———事实与价值二元论。这种理论在 2 0世纪引起重大争议 ,它得到韦伯和摩尔的支持 ,被卡尔纳普、艾耶尔和黑尔等人发展为非认识主义伦理学 ,但受到石里克、普特南、罗蒂和麦金太尔的反对。本文认为 ,二元论者把事实命题和价值命题的区分加以绝对化是错误的 ,症结在于忽视社会事实的特殊性。与自然事实不同 ,社会事实具有内在价值 ,描述社会事实的命题本身就含有价值意义 ,所以 ,从事实命题推出价值命题 ,即从“是”推出“应该” ,不是不可能的
The two articles above and below respectively question the philosophical basis and logical basis of Hume’s rule that “it is impossible to launch” from “yes”. The first part mainly reviews the philosophical basis of Hume’s rule --- the dualism of facts and values. This theory caused major controversy in the 20th century. It was supported by Weber and Moore and developed into a non-cognitivist ethic by Carnap, Ayer and Hale. However, this theory was challenged by Schlick, Putnam, Rorty and MacIntyres oppose. This article argues that it is wrong for dualism to absolutely distinguish the factual proposition from the value proposition, and the crux of the dissertation lies in the neglect of the particularity of social facts. Different from natural facts, the social facts have intrinsic value. The propositions describing the social facts contain value meaning in themselves. Therefore, it is not impossible to put forward the proposition of value from the factual proposition, that is, to launch “should” from “yes”