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《新财富》分析师评选是卖方分析师行业的重要外部激励机制,其有效性对证券市场信息效率有重要意义。本文研究分析师发布信息的质量与评选结果的关系,从而探讨该激励机制的有效性。本文发现:在评选前,获奖分析师发布信息的质量,与未获奖分析师无显著差异;分析师获奖概率与分析师的曝光率及所属机构的市场地位正相关,但与分析师发布信息的质量无关。本文结果暴露出当前分析师行业外部激励的一些不足,这应引起证券市场的关注与反思。
The selection of “New Fortune” analysts is an important external incentive mechanism for the seller’s analyst industry, and its effectiveness is of great significance to the efficiency of the securities market information. This paper studies the relationship between the quality of the information published by analysts and the results of the selection, so as to explore the effectiveness of the incentive mechanism. This paper finds that: Before the selection, the quality of the information released by the winning analyst is not significantly different from that of the non-award-winning analyst. The analyst’s winning probability is positively related to the analyst’s exposure and the market position of the affiliated institution. However, Quality has nothing to do. The results of this paper exposed some of the current lack of external incentives for analysts in the industry, which should arouse the stock market’s attention and reflection.