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生物质燃料收集难是制约生物质发电产业发展的主要因素之一,生物质燃料供给模式对生物质发电产业的发展有着重要作用。本文建立传统模式下经济效益最大化的农户、经济组织、电厂三者的动态博弈模型;并引入基金组织,即村委会组织农户收集燃料,销售收入部分归农户,部分用于村基础设施建设,构建考虑效用最大化的农户、基金组织、电厂三方的博弈模型。结果表明,农户生物质燃料供给量、组织提供给农户的价格同上网电价呈正相关关系,同燃料的运输、存储及预处理成本呈负相关关系。另外,基金组织模式下,效用函数系数对生物质燃料供给量和基金组织给农户的经济利益有一定影响。对两模式进行比较发现,基金组织模式下,农户的生物质燃料供给量和收益均高于传统模式。政府实施激励后农户的效用、组织的效用、电厂的经济利益均增加。
Biomass fuel collection is difficult to restrict the development of biomass power generation industry, one of the main factors, biomass fuel supply model for the development of biomass power generation industry plays an important role. In this paper, we establish a dynamic game model of peasant households, economic organizations and power plants under the traditional mode of maximizing economic benefits. We also introduce the IMF, that is, the village committee organizes the collection of fuel by the peasant households, part of the sales proceeds to the peasant households, and partly to the village infrastructure construction , Construct a game model considering the maximization of utility farmers, funds and power plants. The results show that the supply of biomass fuel to farmers and the price provided by the organization to the farmers are positively correlated with the on-grid electricity price and negatively related to the transportation, storage and pre-treatment costs of the fuel. In addition, in the IMF model, the utility function coefficient has an effect on the supply of biomass fuels and the economic benefits the IMF gives to farmers. Comparing the two models found that under the IMF model, the farmers’ biomass fuel supply and revenue were higher than the traditional model. After the government implemented incentive, the effectiveness of farmers, the effectiveness of the organization and the economic interests of the power plants all increased.