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在塘沽协定缔结之前,日本外务省内部对于中日关系应如何发展出现了意见分歧。这些意见,随着黄郛奉国民政府之命北上处理时局而具体显现出来。在与此事务相关的驻华外交官中,有吉明公使主张应透过支持黄郛,来达成与国民政府的和解并进而与其合作。然而一等书记官中山详一等人则大致接受关东军的主张,认为应在华北成立一个实质上脱离国民政府控制的政权。初采模糊立场的内田康哉外相,其立场大致倾向于中山等人。他最终否决了有吉的构想,并试图与国民政府签订一个政治协定。此一过程具体显现了当时外务省内部在对华外交构想上存在着分歧,以及其对华强硬派常占上风的历史事实。
Prior to the conclusion of the Tanggu Agreement, the Japanese Foreign Ministry internally expressed disagreement over how the relations between China and Japan should develop. These opinions have been concretely manifested with the handling of the affairs of the government by the government of the Kuomintang by Huang Mi. Among the diplomats in China who are involved in the matter, Minister Jiming advocated that reconciliation with the Kuomintang government and further cooperation should be reached through the support of Huangpi. However, first-class registrar Nobuo Nagayama and others generally accepted the idea of the Kwantung Army and believed that a regime that is essentially controlled by the Kuomintang government should be established in north China. Initially adopt a fuzzy position of Uchida Kang Kazai foreign minister, its position generally in favor of Zhongshan and others. He eventually rejected the idea of Kyrgyzstan and attempted to sign a political agreement with the National Government. This process shows the historical differences between the foreign ministry and diplomatic diplomacy with China at the time as well as the fact that its hard-liners in China often prevail.