论文部分内容阅读
本文利用2003~2014年中国家族上市公司的数据,通过PSM-DID方法分析家族企业接班人的性质、企业创始人的政治关联以及公司内部制度与公司业绩之间的经验关系,结果表明:首先,当家族企业创始人有政治关联时,职业经理人的入主会提高企业业绩,反之,职业经理人通过“隧道行为”转移公司资源的可能性会增加;其次,企业家后代入主企业后,企业业绩会有所下滑,但当企业创始人仍在公司留职时,下滑程度将减弱;最后,除了完善内部制度,为了权力平稳交接,公司会增加政治关联的有关开支。
Based on the data of Chinese family-owned listed companies from 2003 to 2014, this paper analyzes the empirical relationship between the succession of family-owned enterprises and the founders’ political connections through the PSM-DID method. The results show that: First of all, When the founders of the family business have the political connection, the occupation of the professional manager will improve the performance of the enterprise. On the contrary, the possibility that the professional manager will divert the company’s resources through the “tunneling” will increase. Secondly, Business performance will decline, but when the founder of the company is still in the company, the extent of the decline will be weakened. Finally, in addition to improving the internal system, in order to smoothly transfer of power, the company will increase the cost of political connections.