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利用1996-2009年省级面板数据分析了财政分权下省级官员异质性与碳排放的关系。研究发现:财政分权与碳排放存在正相关关系,分权度的提高不利于碳排放量的减少,这说明财政分权会降低官员对碳排放管制的努力。官员是影响碳排放的重要因素,省级官员职位、来源类别和任期长短的不同对碳排放控制的影响具有差异性。实证结果显示:相对于京官而言,本省晋升的省长不利于碳排放的减少;加入省级官员来源类别与财政分权的交互项后,本省晋升的省委书记和省长对碳减排的净效应都是正的。随着任期的增加省级官员对碳减排的影响呈现倒U型关系。本省晋升的省委书记对碳排放的影响在直辖市和非直辖市,自治区与非自治区之间存在显著差异。
Using the provincial panel data from 1996 to 2009, we analyzed the relationship between provincial officials’ heterogeneity and carbon emissions under fiscal decentralization. The study found that there is a positive correlation between fiscal decentralization and carbon emissions, and the improvement of decentralization is not conducive to the reduction of carbon emissions, indicating that fiscal decentralization will reduce officials’ efforts on carbon emission control. Officials are important factors that affect carbon emissions. The differences in the positions of provincial officials, the types of sources and the length of their tenure have different impacts on carbon emission control. Empirical results show that compared with the officials in Beijing, governors promoted by the province are not conducive to the reduction of carbon emissions. After they joined the source categories of provincial officials and the fiscal decentralization, provincial party secretary and governor promoted promotion of carbon reduction The net effect of the row is positive. With the increase of tenure, provincial officials showed an inverted U-shaped relationship with the impact of carbon emission reduction. The provincial party secretary promoted by the province has a significant difference in carbon emissions between municipalities and non-municipalities, autonomous regions and non-autonomous regions.