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本文提出企业治理结构选择的理论模型,比较了民主与集权两种治理结构对于公司业绩的影响,认为治理结构的选择依赖于公司生命周期的发展阶段。在创业阶段,集权的治理结构更有效率,但要求兼作经理人的创业者有充足的资金。若资金不足,由于经理人控制权寻租和小股东投票权损失,公司面临较高的融资成本,作为补偿,要求经理人的商业能力要显著高于经理人市场的平均水平,即经理人能力同自有资金在一定程度上可相互替代。本文还应用指数化期权定价方法给出了小股东投票权损失估值,结果表明,经理人市场平均商业能力提高越快,投票权损失越大。
This paper proposes a theoretical model for the selection of corporate governance structure and compares the impact of the two governance structures of democratization and centralization on firm performance. The choice of governance structure depends on the stage of development of the company’s life cycle. In the entrepreneurial stage, the centralized governance structure is more efficient but requires adequate funding for entrepreneurs who are both managers. If the funds are insufficient, the company faces a higher financing cost due to the rent-seeking of managers and the loss of minority shareholders’ voting rights. As a compensation, the manager’s commercial ability is significantly higher than the average of the manager’s market, that is, the manager’s ability With its own funds to a certain extent, can be replaced by each other. The paper also gives the valuation of the minority shareholders’ voting rights using the indexed option pricing method. The results show that the faster the manager’s average commercial ability increases, the greater the loss of voting rights.