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受规制企业的资本结构与政府价格规制密切相关。本文建立了一个两阶段动态博弈模型并提出了相关的理论假设,以检验受规制企业资本结构决策与政府价格规制强度之间的关系。理论分析表明,资本结构选择作为企业的战略工具,能提高企业的谈判地位,迫使规制机构提高产品价格。因而企业面临的价格规制越严厉,越有动力提高负债水平。本文利用沪、深两地的受规制上市公司为样本进行的实证研究有效地支持了本文上述的假设。
The capital structure of regulated enterprises is closely related to the government price regulation. This paper establishes a two-stage dynamic game model and puts forward relevant theoretical hypotheses to test the relationship between the capital structure decision of regulated enterprises and the intensity of government price regulation. Theoretical analysis shows that the choice of capital structure as a strategic tool for enterprises can improve the negotiating position of enterprises and force regulatory agencies to raise the prices of products. Therefore, the more severe the price regulation faced by enterprises, the more motivated they are to raise their debt levels. The empirical study of the listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen for the sample effectively supports the above hypothesis.