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Dewatripont-Maskin(1995)将软预算约束描述为一种“事前无效,事后有效”的动态激励问题,认为信贷的分散化有助于消除软预算约束。文章在DM(1995)模型基础上引入控制权收益变量,论证了“事前无效,事后也无效”软预算约束的存在条件,指出这种软预算约束本质上是控制权人追求私人收益的道德风险行为。信贷的分散化不足以消除事后无效率的软预算约束。完善的公司治理机制和法律机制是减少事后无效率软预算约束的有效途径。
Dewatripont-Maskin (1995) described the soft budget constraint as a dynamic incentive problem that is “pre-emptive and ex post facto”, arguing that the decentralization of credit helps to eliminate soft budget constraints. Based on the DM (1995) model, this paper introduces the controlling income variable and proves the existence conditions of the soft budget constraint, which is “invalid beforehand and afterwards invalid”, and points out that this soft budget constraint is essentially the pursuit of private benefits Moral hazard behavior. The decentralization of credit is not enough to eliminate soft budget constraints that are ineffective afterwards. Perfect corporate governance and legal mechanisms are effective ways to reduce the post-inefficient soft budget constraints.