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以沪深300家家族控股上市公司为研究样本,建立家族控制对代理成本影响的分析模型,实证分析结果表明:家族持股比例与代理成本呈显著的负相关关系;家族成员担任董事长或总经理有利于降低代理成本;家族董事对代理成本的影响不明显。
Taking Shanghai and Shenzhen 300 family-controlled listed companies as the research sample, this paper establishes an analysis model of the influence of family control on agency costs. The empirical analysis shows that: the proportion of family holdings is significantly negatively correlated with agency costs; family members as chairman or total Managers help to reduce agency costs; family directors have no obvious influence on agency costs.