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文章构造了一个上级政府和下级政府之间的拨款博弈模型来解释观察到的拨款博弈现象。模型表明上级任期和下级类型(财力状况)分布的不同组合,会导致存在拖延和等靠的分离均衡、几乎没有拖延的混同均衡,以及富足下级伪装财力困难而上级随机拨款的半分离均衡;而下级项目的投资效益是影响拨款进度的关键因素。与那些将“拖延”和“等靠”归结为上级工作效率低下的传统观点不同,本文表明,对于一个追求效率的上级,拖延行为也可能因信息不对称而发生。
The article constructs a fundraising game model between a superior government and a subordinate government to explain the observed appropriation game phenomenon. The model shows that the different combinations of the senior term and the subordinate type (financial status) distribution lead to the separation and equalization of delay and reliance, the mix-equilibrium with almost no delay, The investment efficiency of subordinate projects is a key factor affecting the progress of appropriation. Unlike traditional wisdom that “procrastination” and “reliance” fall into the inefficiencies of superiors, the paper shows that procrastination can also occur as a result of asymmetric information for a superior who is pursuing efficiency.