在委托—代理视角下,由于分税制改革所带来的地方财力不足的问题,导致地方政府与中央政府的政策目标的不一致。地方政府可能会采取追求自身利益最大化的行为,致使中央政府的政策目标被扭曲。本文基于政府间的静态条件下纳什均衡博弈和委托—代理视角分析房地产调控难的主要原因,以期对于政府的房地产调控失效问题做出解释。 In the perspective of principal-agent, due to the lack of local financial resources brought by the tax-sharing reform, the policy objectives of the local government and the central government are inconsistent. Local governments may take the pursuit of their own interests to maximize the behavior, resulting in the central government’s policy objectives are distorted. This article analyzes the main reasons for the difficulty of regulation and control of real estate based on the Nash equilibrium game under the static state of the government and the principal-agent perspective, with a view to explaining the failure of the government regulation and control of real estate.