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美国的政治体制和贸易政策形成的机制,表明其“碳关税”政策是国内利益集团和政府博弈均衡的结果。文章在Grossman-Helpman(1994)“销售保护模型”的基础上,建立碳关税博弈模型,构建利益函数对利益集团和政府的行为进行博弈模拟。结果显示,如果美国政府是一个自利政府,同时存在利益集团政治捐献的情况下,政府出于自身利益最大化的考虑会提高碳关税税率,以保护利益集团和自身的利益。同时,利益集团在政府收益函数中的权重越高(即政府获得的政治捐献越高),碳关税政策将更多地受到利益集团游说的影响。
The formation mechanism of the U.S. political system and trade policy shows that its “carbon tariff” policy is the result of a balanced game between domestic interest groups and the government. On the basis of Grossman-Helpman (1994) “sales protection model ”, this paper establishes a carbon tariff game model and constructs a profit function to simulate the behavior of interest groups and government. The result shows that if the U.S. government is a self-serving government and the political donations of interest groups exist at the same time, the government will raise the carbon tariff rate for the sake of maximizing its own interests so as to protect interest groups and their own interests. At the same time, the higher the weight of interest groups in the government revenue function (that is, the higher the government’s contribution to politics), the more the carbon tariff policy will be affected by interest group lobbying.