高管薪酬与企业绩效之间的关系问题一直是管理学界研究的热点,如果薪酬结构设计得当,就能够有效降低股东与管理层之间的委托代理成本,从而提高公司价值,增加股东财富;反之,如果薪酬结构设计不当,就可能会导致对管理层激励的失效,进而引发管理层为追求自身利益而牺牲股东利益的行为,最终激化二者之间的矛盾。 The relationship between executive pay and corporate performance has always been a hot topic in the field of management studies. If the salary structure is properly designed, it can effectively reduce the agency costs between shareholders and management, thereby increasing the company’s value and increasing shareholders’ wealth. On the contrary If the salary structure is improperly designed, it may lead to the failure of the management incentive and lead the management to sacrifice the interests of the shareholders for the pursuit of one’s own interests, finally intensifying the conflict between the two.