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1994年分税制改革以来,我国财政高额超收现象成为了一种常态。财政连年高额超收,对我国经济社会的发展弊远大于利。财政超收现象属于官僚机构的预算行为范畴,根据官僚最大化理论修正模型,官僚会因追求自由裁量预算最大化而做出一些有利于自身的预算行为。本文利用官僚预算最大化理论的修正模型对财政超收的主观因素进行剖析,并相应提出控制财政超收的对策措施。
Since the tax-sharing reform in 1994, the phenomenon of China’s high financial oversupply has become a norm. The high surpluses of finance in successive years have far outweighed the economic and social development in our country. The phenomenon of fiscal overruns belongs to the budgetary activities of bureaucrats. According to the bureaucratic maximization theory, bureaucrats can make some budgetary actions that are in their favor by maximizing discretionary budgets. In this paper, the revision model of the bureaucratic budget maximization theory is used to analyze the subjective factors of fiscal overspending and corresponding countermeasures are put forward to control overcapacity.