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本文通过构建由一个零售商与两个制造商构成的两层供应链博弈模型,分析出口制造商在与进口国制造商进行双寡头竞争过程中,如何才能有效地通过提高品牌投资来避免低价销售,降低出口产品受反倾销的风险。分析表明:制造商的品牌投资能力存在一个临界值,仅当品牌投资能力大于该临界值时,制造商才会主动提高品牌投资力度,避免低价销售。同时,还运用该模型定量评估了出口国的各种出口激励措施对出口品牌建设与回避反倾销的具体作用。
This paper builds a two-tier supply chain game model consisting of a retailer and two manufacturers to analyze how export manufacturers can effectively avoid low prices by improving brand investment in the process of duopoly competition with manufacturers in importing countries. Sales, reduce the risk of anti-dumping of export products. The analysis shows that there is a critical value for the manufacturer’s brand investment ability. Only when the brand investment ability exceeds the critical value, the manufacturer will take the initiative to increase brand investment and avoid low-price sales. At the same time, the model was used to quantitatively assess the specific role of various export incentives in exporting countries for export brand building and evading anti-dumping.