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自1978年分权改革以来,地方政府在招商引资上开展了激烈的竞争。在行政分权方面,地方政府通过压低劳动力价格、优惠土地出让及信贷干预等吸引资本;在财政分权方面,地方政府又通过预算内收入、预算外资金及预算内支出的结构等偏向资本所有者。这样,在政治集权而行政分权、财政分权的体制下,地方政府严重影响了收入在资本所有者和普通劳动者之间的分配。基于1978～2007年时序数据的协整检验也证实了上述分析。
Since the decentralization reform in 1978, local governments have fiercely competed on investment promotion. In the area of administrative decentralization, local governments attract capital by depressing labor prices, preferential land sales and credit interventions. In terms of fiscal decentralization, local governments also favor capital-owned projects through their budgetary revenues, the structure of extra-budgetary funds and budgetary expenditures, By. In this way, under the system of political centralization and decentralization and fiscal decentralization, local governments have seriously affected the distribution of income among capital owners and ordinary workers. The cointegration test based on the time series data from 1978 to 2007 also confirmed the above analysis.