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政治预测市场中的操纵往往通过使交易价格发生变化而影响其他外部参与者、观察者对于事件的看法进而实现操纵的目的。美国商品期货交易委员会和法院可以通过分析以下因素来判断交易者是否企图操纵政治预测市场:(1)购买合约的价格是否大大高于市场价格;(2)是否在价格急剧上升的时候大量达成交易;(3)就整个市场而言,是否出现一个超级大单;(4)是否存在某一交易者只在某一候选人身上重金下注;(5)在交易后某一候选人的合同价格是否与该候选人民意调查的数据有显著差异;(6)在试图操纵交易发生后,不同的政治预测市场之间是否存在套利机会;(7)涉嫌操纵的交易者是否属于某一党派成员;(8)候选人是否赞同那些可能使交易者自身或与交易者有私交的党派获利或亏损的政策;(9)交易者是否曾有帮助竞选的经历。在商品市场的语境下,一些学者认为,政府对商品期货市场操纵行为进行监管是不必要的,因为这些期货合约的交易者有自发的私人动机予以调节。虽然他们的实验聚焦于弱势预测市场,但汉森和奥佩尔认为,最大的金融市场拥有最准确的信息和价格,因为在更大规模的市场中参与到大笔噪声交易的其他交易者也会相应地改变自己的交易行为。
Political Prediction The manipulation in the market often affects other external participants by altering the price of the transaction, and the observer’s view of the event, in turn, enables manipulation. The CFTC and the courts can determine whether traders are attempting to manipulate the market for political predictions by analyzing (1) whether the price of the purchase contract is significantly above the market price, (2) whether the transaction was massively traded at a sharp price increase ; (3) whether there is a single super big order for the market as a whole; (4) whether there is a single player who places a big bet on only one candidate; (5) the contract price of one of the candidates after the transaction Whether there is a significant difference from the data of the candidate opinion polls; (6) whether there is any arbitrage opportunity between the different political forecast markets after attempting to manipulate the transaction; (7) whether the trader suspected of manipulating belongs to a party; (8) whether the candidate favors a policy of gain or loss for parties that may have traders themselves or who have personal dealings with traders, and (9) whether traders have had an experience in helping to run the election. In the context of commodity markets, some scholars believe that government regulation of manipulation of commodity futures markets is unnecessary because traders of these futures contracts have spontaneous and private incentives to regulate them. Although their experiments focused on the underpriced markets, Hansen and Opal argue that the largest financial markets have the most accurate information and prices because other traders involved in large noise trades in larger markets also Will change their trading behavior accordingly.